Written By Charles Khalaf
Lebanon has been boiling since the disappearance of Pascal Suleiman… Again!
On the eve of Sunday, the 7th of April, Pascal Suleiman, a prominent official in the Jbeil district of the Lebanese forces political party was attacked and kidnapped by men who blocked him while on his way back from a funeral in the town of Kharbe in Mount Lebanon. While the story and reasons behind his disappearance were still unclear, Lebanese forces leader Samir Geagea visited the party’s headquarters in Mastita Jbeil with hundred off supporters assembling followed by calls on social networks to block the national road of Jbeil demanding the official security forces to investigate the matter.
Lebanon is no stranger to such stories, having rapidly transcended the boundaries of a criminal investigation into a litmus test for the country’s longstanding identity politics. On the next day, the Lebanese army announced in a statement on X that “following the kidnaping of Pascal Sleiman on Sunday, the Army intelligence services arrested several Syrians involved in the operation”(Lorient Today, 2024). Later on in the afternoon, they announced the arrest of three additional Syrians that allegedly took part in the kidnaping. Tensions and anger have been rising on the disrupted streets of Jbeil following the minor developments and on Monday night around 11pm, the Lebanese army declared that Pascal Suleiman was killed, and his body taken to Syria.
The tragic story of Suleiman is not merely a kidnapping story etched in the annals of crime, as portrayed by the official investigation result of the state concluding that Suleiman was “killed in an attempted car burglary”, and that the criminals had “transported his remains to Syria” but the car was left with his belongings in Lebanon (Lorient Today, 2024). Aside from the official story that once looked upon closer scrutiny appears riddled with inconsistencies and gaps that erode its credibility, the event serves as a mirror reflecting the multifaced challenges that pervade daily life in Lebanon. It does not only bring to the fore the plight of a nation grappling with the presence of refugees but also exposes the profound dysfunction of a state crumbling under its own deficiencies, overshadowed by sectarian militias that operate beyond its authority.
The incident swiftly mutated into an emblematic story of identity, with fingers pointed and the collective gaze of a nation turning towards Syrian refugees within its borders. According to UNCHR, Lebanon remains the country holding the largest number of refugees per capita, with an estimated 1.5 million with merely half of them being officially registered (UNCHR, 2024). The Syrian refugee crisis has had major socio-economic and political implications on Lebanon’s daily life. The immediate reaction to Suleiman’s death appeared in horrific scenes of violence on social media platforms against innocent Syrian refugees. ‘Syrians in the outskirts of Beirut were attacked by groups of furious men, beaten up and deprived from their belongings’ according to a video circulated Monday night from the area of Burj Hamood. Furthermore, official statements from the internal security forces and municipalities ordered Syrian refugees to “stay out of sight” during the tense days following the assassination (Lorient today, 2024). This highlights how the collective psyche is primed to filter such a tragedy through identity-based discrimination, entrenched in national and ethnic divides.
Lebanon finds itself again outmanoeuvred by the forces of identity that dominate public discourse, yet in different ways. A portion of society is fuelling their fear and anger at innocent Syrian refugees in a narrative steeped not necessary in economic competition and outbreaks of the refugee crisis, but ethnic differences and hatred rooted in a history of political tension. It’s a valid example of how the abstract concept of national identity can override the principles of justice and human compassion. The result has always been the return of violence on the streets of Beirut.
Conversely, the role of non-state militias such as Hezbollah casts a critical eye on the resilience of sectarian identities and its role in shaping Lebanon’s political landscape. One cannot deny that the existence and actions of a militia like Hezbollah outside state control, such as its military campaign in the south against Israel contributing significantly to the weakening of the state that holds no real sovereignty in Lebanon. Furthermore, the party of “God” has strong record of being allegedly suspected and tied to inner political assassinations where justice never bares light from the Lebanese government. But here again, it is sectarian identity that is manifested in public as the “other” that will “eat us”, with particular focus on the power dynamics within the nation regardless of the role of the state . This can be clearly seen in Hassan Nasrallah’s public appearance one day after the kidnapping: “What happened yesterday should serve as a lesson to all Lebanese, and particularly to Christians. Those in Lebanon who prevent division are precisely those who are accused of sedition.” He also spoke of a “very dangerous” phase for the country, calling on the various parties to “keep calm”(L’Orient Today, 2024).
Both perspectives of identity converge on a common thread: A failed state’s inability to assert its authority or provide security for its citizens. Identity, this malleable social construct quickly fills the void, seamlessly immersing itself to any given situation, whether against a marginalized group like refugees or within the complex web of sectarian affiliations to falsely dictate narratives and wiled undue influence and violence over the social and political order.
“Do not kill me I have children”. These were the last words of Pascal Suleiman prior to his disappearance on the eve of Sunday the 7th of April. As long as the state in Lebanon remains staggering under the weight of its own failures, unable to maintain law and order within its borders and deliver justice there will always be a Pascal Suleiman. And as long as the Lebanese keep perceiving these failures through the lens of identity, they will never be able to build a strong state and innocent people will pay the price. In the same logic, there will always be an “Abou Addas” that killed Rafik el Hariri, a “black smith mistake” that exploded the Beirut Port, and “Syrian workers” that killed Pascal Suleiman. Yet these figures, with their seemingly disparate stories, tread a common trail, one that is always rooted in tyranny and blood on its road to Jerusalem.
Bibliography
L’Orient Today. (2024, April 8). The disappearance of LF executive Pascal Sleiman causes concern amidst political turmoil. L’Orient-Le Jour. Retrieved April 13, 2024, from https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1409655/the-disappearance-of-lf-executive-pascal-sleiman-causes-concern-amidst-political-turmoil.html
UNHCR Lebanon. (n.d.). Lebanon at a glance. UNHCR. Retrieved April 13, 2024, from https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance
Identity Hunters 